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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
- vs-
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
JAMES WILLIAM WARWICK, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 9205 
Respondent adopts appellant's statement of facts, 
but will cite and comment upon additional facts in the 
course of the argument. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE WRITTEN CONFESSION OF THE DE-
FENDANT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
COMMIT ERROR IN ADMITTING IT. 
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POINT II 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF THE DEFEND-
ANT. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENY-
ING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT BY PLEADING TO THE INFOR-
MATION IN DISTRICT COURT WAIVED ANY 
IRREGULARI'TY OF PROCEDURE AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 24A TO THE 
JURY. 
POINT VI 
ADMISSION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE 
WITNESS ROBERT COIL WAS A PROPER 
EXERCISE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRE-
TION AND, THEREFORE, NOT ERROR. 
POINT VII 
THE ST A TE.'S ASKING THE DEFENDANT IF 
HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED FOR ASSAULT TO 
KILL WAS PROPER CROSS EXAMINATION 
AND NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WRITTEN CONFESSION OF THE DE-
FENDANT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
COMMIT ERROR IN ADMITTING IT. 
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Respondent in its brief will take the liberty to respond 
to Point III of appellant's brief first, then to Point II, and 
third to Point I in that order, since Points I and II depend 
in large measure on the admissibility of the defendant's 
confession, which issue is raised in Point III of appellant's 
brief. 
The testimony with regard to the confession of the 
defendant (Exhibit P) as elicited from Officer Jack Joseph 
Good of the Oakland Police, begins in the transcript at page 
96 and continues through page 116. Additional testimony 
concerning the confession and its voluntariness given by 
Officer George Chamberlain, also of the Oakland Police, 
begins at page 117 and runs through page 120. Further 
testimony concerning the confession obtained from Lt. 
J. M. Stevens, begins at page 209 of the transcript and 
runs through page 212. 
At page 211 the document was offered in evidence..z 
objected to on the same page by the defendant and admitta 
" into evidence by the court on page 212. 
The defendant's testimony concerning the confession 
begins at page 287 and continues through page 292 on di-
rect examination, and is resumed, still on direct, at page 
295 and concluded on page 296 of the transcript. 
Appellant in his brief argues error in admission of the 
confession on the grounds that defendant (1) was not ad-
vised of his right to counsel; (2) that no persons besides 
OfficeT Good and·defendant were present; (3) it was in the 
handwriting of the officer; ( 4) defendant at the time of the 
trial testified he did not read the statement, and (5) that 
there was conflicting testimony as to whether the state .. 
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4 
ment was read aloud by a peace officer to the defendant 
on June 10, 1959. 
The case of State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d, p. 
178, is a landmark case on the law of admissibility of con-
fession in this state. Two pertinent quotations from that 
opinion seem relevant: 
" * * * We hold that the defendant, as a matter of 
right, may give all evidence he has before the 
court, pertaining to the voluntariness of a confes-
sion before the confession is received in evidence; 
and that the court must base its ruling on the com-
petency of the confession as evidence upon all tes-
timony on the question adduced by both state and 
defendant. If on a consideration of all the evidence 
on the matter the court does not find the confession 
to be voluntary it should be excluded as incompe-
tent. To hold otherwise does violence to the consti-
tutional provision that an accused may not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself." 
The court earlier in its opinion cited with approval 
the case of Osborne v. People, 83 Colo. 4, 262 Pac. 892, 901 
in the following language: 
"If this is true, it follows that where the court is in 
doubt whether the confession was voluntary or 
not, the evidence may be admitted, leaving it to the 
jury to determine the weight to which it is entitled 
under all the circumstances." (Emphasis added) 
It is clear from a reading of the pages of the transcript 
above cited that defendant was given ample opportunity to 
put on all his evidence concerning the manner of the taking, 
the time, the place, and the witnesses connected with the 
confession in issue. Indeed, appellant does not complain 
that he was prevented from impeaching the document, but 
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rather, claims that he succeeded in proving it to be in-
admissible because not voluntary. It is to be further ob-
served that each of the grounds upon which appellant re-
lies as the basis for involuntariness runs rather to weight 
and credibility of the document. This Court, in the Crank 
case, supra, spelled out the test of voluntariness in the 
following language: 
"* * * In laying a foundation for offering the writ-
ing, if a written confession, or conversation, if 
an oral confession, the state will of course be re-
quired to show the ti'me and place of the conver-
sation, or the writing and signing of the instrument, 
and also what is generally called a prima facie 
showing that it was the free and voluntary act of 
the accused. Then when the conversation or writing 
is offered, is the time for the accused to make ob-
jection to its competency. When such objection is 
made, the court will hear all the evidence pertain-
ing to that question and itself determine its volun-
tariness as a matter of law-that is, the competency 
of the offered evidence. Unless the parties stipulate 
to the contrary, this evidence had best be taken 
without the presence of the jury. * * *" 
In thus indicating the requirements for the foundation, it is 
to be noted the court says nothing about advising the ac-
cused of his right to counsel. It says nothing about who 
shall write the confession, nor does it say how many wit-
nesses must be present or whether the document must 
be read aloud to, or silently read by, the defendant. Rather, 
the State has the burden of showing the time, the place, 
and the signing of the instrument, together with absence 
of threats or inducements. From the testimony of all the 
above noted witnesses in this case, the State amply has 
shown these elements. A review of the transcript pages 
above cited referring to the confession show: 
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Officer Frank Edwin Steinbrenner: This witness testi-
fied that the defendant on the 30th day of May, 1959, called 
to him and said "I'm going to pin a feather in your·cap," 
to which the witness replied, "How is that?", and the de-
fendant responded, "Well, I wanted to tell you that I 
killed a man," whereupon the witness summoned De-
tective Good. (T. 93). 
Detective Jack Joseph Good: This witness established 
that on May 30, 1959, at the Oakland Jail, in the interroga-
tion room, he had a conversation with the defendant; that 
no one else was present. (T. 96). The conversation occurred 
approximately 12:00 noon. (T. 97). 
Defendant at this point objected to further testimony 
fro:m this witness on the grounds of "no proper founda-
tion." The judge dismissed the jury and the matter was 
argued. (T. 97-101). The jury was recalled and the witness 
repeated the conversation between himself and the de-
fendant. Exhibit P was then marked and given to the 
witness, who established the date (May 30, 1959), the 
place, who was present and how it was prepared. Specif-
ically he said that the witness wrote the statement in his 
own handwriting, writing a paragraph at a time. He "read 
back" each paragraph to the defendant for approval and 
then proceeded. Finally, having finished the statement, 
he handed it to defendant and asked the defendant to read 
it. (T. 101-102). 
After defendant had "appeared" to have finished read-
ing the statement, the witness called an Officer Chamber-
lain. The transcript at page 104, line 3, reads as follows: 
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"Q. Was any statement made to the defendant at 
that time, with regard to the truthfulness of the 
statement?'' 
"A. Yes. 
''Q: What was said? 
"A. He was asked if this was a voluntary statement 
freely given without promises, force or threats, or 
promises of leniency. 
"Q. What did the defendant say? 
"A. He said it was. 
"Q·: Was this in the presence of yourself and Of-
ficer Chamberlain? 
"A. It was." 
The witness then testified that the defendant signed the 
statement and that Officer Chamberlain also signed the 
statement after the defendant. (T. 104). 
Approximately a week later the witness again saw 
the defendant in company with officers from the Ogden 
Police Department, and asked the defendant if the state-
ment (Exhibit P) were true. The statement "was read to 
him in its entirety" and the defendant agreed it was cor-
rect. Additional writing to this effect was added to the 
exhibit and the defendant again signed it in the presence 
of the Ogden officer. (T. 105). 
On cross examination the witness said the total con-
versation and writing of Exhibit P took from one and 
one-half to two hours, and that Chamberlain was present 
not more than the last 15 minutes. (T. 109). Also, on cross 
examination, the foll6wing testimony appears at page 112 
in the transcript, lines 24 through 30, and page 113, lines 1 
through 6: 
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"Q. Now I take it that the language of this state-
ment-the words used and so forth-are words that 
you chose and you put down, following what he 
told you; is that right? 
A. I attempt to follow the Defendant's wording as 
closely as possible. 
Q. He didn't dictate this though? 
A. No, he did not. 
Q. And none of the writing here on it, except the 
signatures as you pointed out, are in his writing? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Do I understand correctly that, as you wrote it, 
you would finish a single paragraph and then read 
that aloud? 
A. Yes.'' 
The witness was asked if he told the defendant of his right 
to legal counsel. The witness replied he had not; that Cal-
ifornia procedure did not require it. (T. 113). 
Defense coun~el also inquired of this witness about a 
conversation concerning the defendant's problem of drink-
ing. (T. 113). On redirect, this witness was asked if he ob-
served the defendant to be sober or under the influence 
of narcotics, alcohol, sedation, etc. He replied his observa-
tions were that the defendant was not under such in-
fluence. (T. 115-116). 
Officer George Chamberlain: This witness testified as 
follows with regard to the witnessing of the defendant's 
signature on Exhibit P. The last paragraph of the state-
ment was read aloud in his presence to the defendant by 
Detective Good. The specific words read aloud were: 
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"This is a true statement given by me voluntarily 
without any force, threats or promises of leniency." 
The witness then testified that he saw the defendant sign 
the statement and that he, the witness, then read the 
statement and signed it himself. 
Lt. J. M. Stephens: This witness testified that on the 
6th day of June, 1959, at 3:00 p.m. in the presence of De-
tective Good and Sgt. Bruestle (Ogden Police Department) 
and the defendant at the Oakland City Jail, there was a 
conversation. (T. 209). The witness told the defendant: 
"We would like you, if you would Mr. Warwick, 
we would like you to read this statement (Exhibit 
P) and if it is correct we would like you to make a 
notation attached to it to the effect it is correct and 
sign it in our presence." 
The witness further told the defendant he did not have 
to do those things. Defendant then wanted to know why. 
The witness explained the defendant would likely go to 
trial and that the witness, together with Sgt. Bruestle, 
would probably be a witness, and by watching the de-
fendant sign such a statement, they could then testify to 
it. (T. 210). 
The testimony at page 210 of the transcript, beginning 
at line 117, reads as follows: 
"Q. Then what did you do? 
A. He finally agreed to the situation. I handed him 
the statement, and asked him to read it. 
Q. What did he do? 
A. He picked up the statement and looked at it, 
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looked at each page, turned them over. After he 
got through he handed the statement back, and I 
asked him if that was true and correct. The way it 
was written. He said yes. 
Q. Did he appear to be reading it? 
A. He appeared to be reading it. 
Q. Then what did you do? 
A. I asked him if ~ would make the notation, on 
the back of it, to the effect that he had read it vol-
untarily, and that it was a true and correct state-
ment. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He said: 'No, I don't want to do that.' He said: 
'You do it.' 
Q. What did you do then? 
A. I turned it over, and wrote the notation on the 
back. 
Q. What did you do then? 
A. After that was done, I handed the statement back 
to him. 
Q. Then what? 
A. And he signed it. And I signed it as a witness 
and Sergeant Bruestle signed it as a witness. 
Q. The notation that you made. on it, do you know 
whether he read it? Or appeared to read it? Or 
whether it was read to him? 
A. I read it to him. 
Q. I show you page 6-what is marked with a num-
eral 6, of State's Exhibit P-and ask you if you rec-
ognize any of the writing upon that page? 
A. That is my writing." 
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At this point, having identified all the writing on the doc-
ument, the State offered Exhibit P in evidence. Defendant 
objected and the Court received it in evidence. (T. 211-212). 
The matters of faulty eyesight, inconsistency of mem-
ory of witnesses, etc. were extensively inquired into by ap-
pellant's counsel and the Court was fully informed of all 
the evidence, both of the State and the defendant concern-
ing the voluntariness of this confession. Thereupon the 
Court admitted the document. Such admisssion respondent 
contends was a legitimate and proper exercise of the trial 
court's discretion. While it may be true that all of the 
evidence concerning voluntariness under the Crank hold-
ing would have better been heard out of the jury's pres-
ence, neither party so moved the court, and in view of the 
fact that the court admitted the document, all of such 
evidence under the Crank holding could have properly 
been received by the jury anyway. The wording in the 
Crank case that is relevant is as folllows: 
"* * * Unless the parties stipulate to the contrary, 
this evidence had best be taken without the pres-
ence of the jury. This is wisdom, since if the con-
fession is excluded, and the state has sufficient 
other evidence to take the case to the jury, the 
confession itself and all the evidence which led to 
its exclusion would not be proper for the consider-
ation of the jury, and if heard by it, ·might well be 
the determining factor in reaching a verdict. * * * 
If on the other hand, the state has shown the con-
fession was voluntary as a matter of law, the court 
admits it in evidence, and it is then for the con-
sideration of the jury for what it is worth together 
with all the other evidence submitted to it. The 
court having decided the confession is competent 
and may be received in evidence, the state need not 
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then further assume the burden of showing its vol-
untariness before the jury. The defendant may put 
in evidence to the jury all the facts and circum-
stances under which the statements were made to 
enable the jury to determine its credibility and the 
weight to be given to it. The state may also offer 
testimony to the jury on that matter by way of 
showing that the statements were freely made and 
therefore entitled to great weight and full credit." 
This Court has repeatedly upheld in the cases of 
Mares v. Hill, 118 Utah 484, 222 P.2d 811, p. 815; State v. 
Braasch, et al., 119 Utah 450, 229 P.2d 289 at 293, and 
State v. Gardner, 119 Utah 529, 230 P.2d 559, at 564, that 
failure to advise tile defendant of his right to counsel does 
not in itself make the confession involuntary. 
In the case of State v. Ashdown, 5 U.2d 59, 296 P.2d 
726 at 729, this Court said in part: 
"Although the burden of proof as to the voluntari-
ness of the confession lies with the party seeking 
to use it as evidence, i.e., the prosecution, after the 
trial court has decided from the evidence that the 
confession was voluntarily made, the appellate 
court will not disturb that finding in the absence 
of a showing of abuse of its discretion where there 
is substantial evidence from which it could reason-
ably so find." 
It is submitted from the above review of the testimony 
(quite apart from the self serving statements of the defend-
ant at the trial about his poor eyesight, etc., referred to 
above) there is ample evidence that the statement was 
voluntarily made and the admission of Exhibit P into 
evidence by the trial court was a proper exercise of dis-
cretion. Indeed, appellant makes no specific assignment 
of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. 
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POINT II 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF THE DEFEND-
ANT. 
Appellant argues that the only evidence of premedita-
tion and deliberation in evidence in the trial of this case 
was the defendant's own confession, and argues that "some 
other evidence" of premeditation besides the confession, 
is necessary to supply this essential element of the State's 
case. As respondent understands it, appellant argues that 
defendant's testimony at the trial and a proper construction 
of defendant's confession (Exhibit P) indicate that this 
death was the simple result of a struggle or a fight between 
two "half drunk" participants, of which the decedent was 
the original aggressor, and that no specific intent to kill, 
or premeditation or deliberation to take a life occurred un-
til after the fight began. 
As admitted by appellant in his brief, the cause of 
death, as testified to by Dr. Warren A. Bennett, was drown-
ing (T. 81), and not the result of blows received by de-
cedent on his head. Dr. Bennett in fact testified that such 
blows may or may not have caused unconsciousness. 
(T. 79). 
At page 3 of defendant's confesssion (Exhibit P) are 
found the words: 
"I hit him behind the left ear after swing him 
around with my left hand. He dropped and he was 
unconscious. I hit him eight or nine more times 
while he was lying helpless on the ground. He did 
not make any movements." 
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Resuming from page 4: 
"When the fight first started I had not intended to 
kill this man but once I hit him I decided I would 
finish his life. To make certain of his death there 
was a creek about 5 feet below from where we 
fought. I dragged the body by one leg. The man 
way lying on his back. I dragged him down an in-
cline and dragged the body into the creek. There 
was a pool of water about 3 or 4 feet iri depth. I 
jerked the body into the creek where the pool of 
water was and turned the body over so that the 
face would be down and he would be sure to drown 
if he ·were alive." · 
While these statements differ with the testimony of the 
defendant at the time of the trial, since both were admis-
sible the jury was at full liberty to choose which account or 
what parts of each it would believe. Clearly, if the jury 
chose to believe the account written in Exhibit P, those 
statements above quoted from Exhibit P demonstrate a de-
liberate desire to take the life of one obviously observed 
to be unconscious. Further, if the jury also believed that 
the defendant did the deliberate, planned act of turning 
McCall face down in the water so that he "would be sure 
to drown if he were alive,'' it would be justified in de-
termining that there was premeditation and deliberation. 
Appellant in his brief implies that the elements of pre-
meditation and deliberation had to occur prior to the 
scuffle which led to the decedent's being knocked uncon-
scious; that absent any such premeditation at that point, 
a verdict of first degree murder is untenable. Such an in-
terpretation, to be valid, would require the decedent to 
have been killed as a result of the blows on the head, and 
death to have occurred either at the time or inevitably and 
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immediately thereafter from that sole cause. As indicated 
above, however, the cause of death was not the blows to 
the head inflicted by defendant with his wrench in hand, 
but rather from drowning. 
If, therefore, the jury believed that there was an ap-
preciable period of time, as indicated in Exhibit P, follow-
ing defendant's rendering the decedent helpless during 
which the defendant deliberated and meditated and de-
termined to take further steps to snuff out the decedent's 
life, as observed above, the jury would be justified in re-
turning a verdict of guilty of first degree murder. The 
Court, in Instruction No. 7, properly defined the words 
"deliberate" and "premeditate" and correctly stated the 
Utah law in that connection. The Court said in part: 
" 'Premediate' means the act of meditating, con-
triving or designing beforehand for any length of 
time. The time must be sufficient, however, for 
some reflection on and consideration of the act in 
contemplation during which the alternative choices 
of killing and not killing are debated in the mind 
of the actor for the formation of a definite purpose 
to kill. When the lapse of time is sufficient for this 
purpose, it matters not how short the time may be. 
Whether or not a premeditated design to kill was 
formed must be determined from all the facts and 
circumstances of the case, including the mental 
condition of the defendant." 
The court further instructed the jury in Instruction 
No. 9 that premeditation and deliberation could not be 
presumed from the mere fact of killing. 
Appellant relies in support of his position on the Wy-
oming case of State v. Martinez, 342 P.2d 227, where a first 
degree murder verdict was found by a jury and set aside 
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by the Wyoming Supreme Court on the basis that defend-
ant's confession was the only evidence of premeditation 
and deliberation, and upon viewing. the confession as a 
whole there were no statements which could be reasonably 
construed to give rise to premeditation or deliberation. Spe-
cifically in his confession defendant said only that he was 
acting out of fear for his own life. Such is not the case in 
the confession before this court, and, in particular, the 
statements cited earlier in this point. Respondent contends, 
therefore, that the Martinez case gives no aid and comfort 
to appellant, since statements indicating deliberation and 
premeditation clearly appear in defendant's confession. 
It is also to be observed that the court properly in-
structed the ·jury in· Instruction No. 30 that they were to 
view the confession of defendant admitted into evidence 
with proper caution and in connection with all the sur-
rounding circumstances. 
The only issue in this case is whether the jury should 
have believed the statements in the confession as opposed 
to the testimony of the defendant at the time of the trial, 
and appellant himself concedes that it is the jury's prerog-
ative to choose which version of the facts it prefers to 
believe. 
The jury in this case was properly instructed that it 
was to determine the existence or lack of existence of pre-
meditation and deliberation from all the facts and circum-
stances of the case, and since in fact the jury has so de-
termined, and since in fact there was competent evidence 
before the jury from which such a determination could be 
made, and hence no abuse of its discretion on the part of 
the jury, this Court should not overturn that verdict. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENY-
ING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
This Court has repeatedly held7 most recently in the 
case of State v. Iverson, -Utah-, 350 P.2d 152, that so 
long as there was competent evidence unon which a jury 
TR•A~ 
might return a verdict of guilty, the~Court cannot dismiss 
a criminal information on the grounds of insufficiency of 
evidence. 
The court in the Iverson case said: 
"The law involved is ably discussed in the opinion 
of Justice Wolfe in State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 
157 P.2d 258. The controlling principle is that upon 
such a motion the evidence is to be viewed most 
favorably to the state, and if when so viewed, the 
jury acting fairly and reasonably could find the de-
fendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge 
is required to submit the case· to the jury for de-
termination of the guilt or innocenee of defendant." 
In the case of State v. Penderville, 2 U.2d 281, 272 P.2d 
195, the court said. 
''* * * It has been repeatedly held by this court that 
upon a motion to dis\miss or to direct a verdict of 
not guilty for lack of evidence that the trial court 
does not consider the weight of the evidence or 
credibility of the witnesses, but determines the 
naked legal proposition of law, whether there is 
any substantial evidence of the guilt of the accused, 
and all reasonable inferences are to be taken in 
favor of the state. * * * (Cases cited) As is pointed 
out in one or more of these cases, the trial court has 
a discretion in the case of a motion for a new trial 
that it does not have in case of a motion to dismiss 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
or to direct a verdict of not guilty. Nevertheless, in 
either case if there is before the court evidence upon 
which reasonable men might differ as to whether 
the defendant is or is not guilty, he may deny the 
motion.'' 
In the case of State v. Lewellyn, 71 Utah 331, 366 Pac. 
261,_ an adultery prosecution where defendant made a mo-
tion for a directed verdict, which motion is equivalent to 
the motion to dismiss under consideration here, the court 
said: 
"In 16 C'.J. 935, the conclusions of various courts 
are condensed in the statement: 
'As a general rule the court should direct a verdict 
of acquittal * * * where there is no competent evi-
dence reasonably tending to sustain the charge; 
or where the evidence is undisputed and so weak 
that a conviction would be attributable to passion 
or prejudice, or where it is so slight and indeterm-
inate that a verdict of guilty would be set aside, as 
where the evidence consists solely of the uncorrob-
orated testimony of an accomplice, or is insufficient 
to overcome the presumption of innocense, or to 
show defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
But the case should be submitted to the jury and 
the court should not direct a verdict of acquittal, 
if there is any evidence to support or reasonably 
tending to support the charge, as where it is suf-
ficient to overcome prima facie the presumption 
of innocense, or where the evidence of a material 
nature is conflicting.' (Emphasis added) 
From Pace v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 560, 186 
S.W. 142, we quote the syllabus on this point as 
follows: 
'It is only in the absence of any evidence tending 
to establish the guilt of the accused that the trial 
court will be authorized to grant a peremptory in-
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struction directing his acquittal.' 
The same principle is decided in State v. Gross, 
Ohio St. 161, 110 N.E. 466. 
An able discussion and determination of the bounds 
of judicial authority in considering a motion for a 
directed verdict is contained in Isbell v. U.S. 142 
C.C.A. 312, 227 F. 788, in which it is made clear 
that the court in such case does not consider the 
weight of evidence or credibility of witnesses but 
determines the naked legal proposition of law 
whether there is any substantial evidence of the 
guilt of the accused. This is undoubtedly the correct 
rule. See annotation 'Directing Acquittal,' 17 A.L.R. 
910. The function of a court in dealing with an ap-
plication for a directed verdict must not be con-
fused with that in considering a motion for a new 
trial u pan the grounds of insufficiency of evidence. 
The court has a discretion in the latter case which 
he does not properly have in the former. The reason 
for the distinction is. that the order sought in one 
case acquits the accused and finally ends the prose-
cution, while in the other, the order, if granted, 
does not discharge the accused but merely gives 
him the advantage and benefit of another trial. The 
rule is controlled by the same principles in crim-
inal cases as in civil procedure. And in a civil case, 
Stam v. Ogden P. & P. Co., 53 Utah 248, 177 P. 218, 
this court said: 
'It is familiar doctrine in this jurisdiction and per-
haps in nearly every other where the jury system 
prevails, that, if there is any substantial evidence 
whatever upon which to base a verdict, the court 
will not withdraw the case from the jury or direct 
what their verdict should be'." 
Since, as observed in the previous points argued, there 
is competent and substantial evidence in Exhibit P alone 
from which a jury could have returned (and in fact did 
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return) a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, as a 
matter of law the trial court did not err in denying the 
defendant's motion to dismiss. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT BY PLEADING TO THE INFOR-
MATION IN DISTRICT COURT WAIVED ANY 
IRREGULARITY OF PROCEDURE AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING STAGE. 
The appellant in this case has not filed a designation 
of the record on· appeal and the transcript of the prelim-
inary hearing in this trial was not included in the record 
on appeal, and respondent, accordingly, has no opportunity 
to review the defects in the preliminary hearing to which 
appellant refers in Point IV of his brief. The substance of 
appellant's argument, however, was that the written con-
fession (Exhibit P) was improperly admitted into evidence 
at the preliminary hearing. 
In spite of the absence of the preliminary hearing 
transcript, the controlling Utah statute (77-16-2, U.C.A. 
1953) eliminates this point from being properly considered 
by this Court in the following language: 
"No defect or irregularity in or want or absence 
of any proceeding or statutory requirement, prior 
to the filing of an information or indictment, in-
cluding the prelimi~ry hearing, shall constitute 
prejudicial error and the defendant shall be con-
clusively presumed to have waived any such defect, 
irregularity, want or absence of proceeding or stat-
utory requirement, unless he shall before pleading 
to the information or indictment specifically and 
expressly object to the information or indictment 
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on such ground.- Whenever the consent of the state 
to any waiver by the defendant is required, such 
consent shall be conclusively presumed, unless the 
state before or at the time the defendant pleads to 
the information or indictment expressly objects to 
such waiver." 
This statute has been cited and upheld in State v. Crank, 
supra, p. 181. Since in this case defendant entered a plea 
of not guilty to the information filed in the District Court, 
he thus waived his objection to any irregularity in the 
preliminary hearing and said defects are not now appeal-
able before this body. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 24A TO THE 
JURY. 
Appellant argues error not on the basis that Instruc-
tion 24A is an incorrect statement of the law with regard to 
the question of self defense and subsequent aggression, but 
rather that it is incomplete. Appellant argues that the 
Court should have further instructed the jury that the 
defendant, having rendered the decedent helpless, had no 
affirmative duty thereafter to go to his aid. Respondent 
contends that such a proposed instruction would not deal 
directly with and would not be a proper part of the subject 
treated by Instruction 24A. 
The matter of giving instructions or refusing same has 
long been held the province of the trial court, 3 Am. Jur., 
para. 971, 74 ALR 841. In criminal cases the courts have 
held that the verdict of the jury will not be overturned for 
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failure of trial court to give an instruction unless such 
failure co·nstitutes prejudicial error. In that connection in 
the case of People v. Davis, 43, Cal. 2d 661, 176 P.2d 801 at 
808, the Supreme Court of the State of California said: 
"Reviewing courts will scrutinize with great care 
any claim of prejudicial error predicated solely 
upon the omission of the trial court to give of its 
own motion and instruction, the propriety of which 
is indicated solely by the condition of the evidence. 
Prejudicial error will be held to exist if, upon an 
examination of the entire record * * * (cases cited) 
it appears that the giving of the instructions was 
vital to a proper disposition of the case." (Emphasis 
added). 
In the Davis case, defendant was tried for performing 
abortions and on appeal defense counsel argued prejudicial 
error on the grounds that the trial court failed to instruct 
the jury that a specific witness was an accomplice, whose 
testimony needed corroboration. 
This court has spoken on the subject of prejudicial 
error most recently in the case of State v. Neal, 1 U.2d 122~ 
262 P.2d 756. The opinion reads in part: 
"We will not reverse criminal causes for mere error 
or irregularity. It is only when there has been error 
which is both substantial and prejudicial to the 
rights of the accused that a reversal is warranted.'~ 
The c·ourt then cites Section 77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953, which 
provides: 
"After hearing an appeal the court must give judg-
ment without regard to errors or defects which do 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. If 
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error has been committed, it shall not be presumed 
to have resulted in prejudice. The court must be 
satisfied that it has that effect before it is warr~nted 
in reversing the judgment." 
While it is the function of the appellate court to de-
termine in each fact situation what is prejudicial, respond-
ent herein submits that a fair inference which 12 reason-
able jurors, independent of any instruction, might well 
make, is that a defendant who is attacked and defends 
himself quite naturally has neither the inclination nor the 
duty to go to the aid of a helpless attacker. It is further 
suggested that to constitute prejudicial error, it must be 
demonstrated that the trial court in failing to give such an 
instruction to the jury has committed such error that had 
the instruction been given, the jury would have returned 
a different verdict. See People v. Lopez, 32 Cal. 2d673, 197 
P.2d 757 at 759. Respondent contends that this Court may 
reasonably determine that had such an instruction as re-
quested by defendant been given to the jury, the verdict 
would have been the same and that absent instruction, 
the jurors may well have considered that the defendant 
had no duty to go to the aid of McCall. 
It must be further observed that the jury apparently 
chose to believe the statements appearing in defendant's 
confession which, if believed, made the question of going 
to the aid of the decedent moot in that they illustrate con-
duct of the opposite nature. That is, he affirmatively took 
• steps to insure McCall's death after rendering him helpless. 
Counsel for appellant cites no case authority to demon-
strate that there is no duty to go to the aid of a helpless 
assailant. Adopting for a moment the defendant's theory 
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that a scuffle occurred and that at the end of the alterca-
tion defendant discovered McCall lying face down in the 
water unconscious, and thereafter left the scene, respond-
ent submits this is not merely abandoning someone who is 
helpless, but more an adandonment of someone who is help-
less and in dire peril of losing his life. Whether the same 
lack of duty to go to the aid obtains in such a situation 
remains to be demonstrated. Counsel for defendant in tak-
ing exception to the Court's failure to give such an instruc-
tion at the time of the trial did not demonstrate the validiy 
of such a proposed instruction and has not so demonstrated 
on appeal, but has done no more than suggest such an in-
struction should have been given. 
Accordingly respondent contends that no error was 
committed by the trial court in giving Instruction 24A. 
., 
POINT VI 
ADMISSION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE 
WITNESS ROBERT· COIL WAS A PROPER 
EXERCISE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRE-
TION AND, THEREFORE, NOT ERROR. 
POINT VII 
THE STATE'S ASKING THE. DEFENDANT IF' 
HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED FOR ASSAULT TO 
KILL WAS PROPER CROSS EXAMINATION 
AND NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR . 
The remaining two points of this brief have to do with 
alleged errors committed during the course of the trial in 
the admitting of the testimony of the witness Robert Coil 
and in permitting the State on cross examination to ask 
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the defendant if his arrest in Oakland had been on the 
charge of "assault to kill." Under the doctrine of discre-
tion of the trial court cited above (3 Am. Jur., para. 971) 
and the ruling in the Neal case, supra, the question of 
admissibility of evidence or propriety ·of questions asked 
is a discretionary matter for the trial judge, and in the 
absence of showing prejudice to the rights of the accused, 
there is no reversible error. Appellant argues that testi-
mony of the witness Coil was too indefinite an identifica-
tion. He cites the case of Phillips v. State, 297 S.W.2d. 135, 
in support of his argument. It must be observed in that case 
the identification by the witness supplied an essential ele-
ment of the crime connecting the defendant with the rob-
bery. In the case before this court, the identification by 
the witness Coil, if believed, tended to show no more than 
that the decedent and the defendant had been seen to-
gether prior to the crime. The jury could well have reached 
its verdict without the testimony of this witness. Defense 
Counsel had ample opportunity to impeach this witness 
and did so, and it Q proper exetcise of the court's dis-
cretion to permit the testimony to go to the jury to be 
given what weight, if any, the jury might choose. 
In the transcript at page 296, the defendant on direct 
examination stated: 
"I was arrested for drunk and disturbing the peace 
at my ex wife's home." 
He had earlier testified that his ex wife's home was located 
in Oakland, California. On cross examination counsel for 
the State inquired into the conduct of the defendant at his 
ex wife's home in Oakland on the day of his arrest. Coun-
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sel for the defendant objected and the court overruled the 
objection, finding that such questions were proper cross 
examination. In the course of such cross examination the 
State twice asked the defendant if in fact his arrest was 
for assault to kill and that the charge had been reduced 
to disturbing the peace, to which he plead guilty. The 
defendant denied the charge of assault to kill, but admitted 
pleading guilty to the offense of disturbing the peace and 
being sentenced to 30 days. A reading of the record indi-
cates that the subject of defendant's arrest was raised dur-
ing the course of the direct examination; and the questions 
objected to on cross, while perhaps prejudicial, were none-
theless proper cross e~amination. The court accordingly 
did not abuse its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, respondent submits that 
the verdict and judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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